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Quantum Metalanguage and The New Cognitive
Synthesis
Alexey V Melkikh1*, Andrei Khrennikov2 and Roman V Yampolskiy3
ABSTRACT
Problems with mechanisms of thinking and cognition in many ways remain unresolved. Why are a priori inferences
possible? Why can a human understand but a computer cannot? It has been shown that when creating new concepts,
generalization is contradictory in the sense that to be created concepts must exist a priori, and therefore, they are
not new. The process of knowledge acquisition is also contradictory, as it inevitably involves recognition, which can
be realized only when there is an a priori standard. Known approaches of the framework of artificial intelligence (in
particular, Bayesian) do not determine the origins of knowledge, as these approaches are effective only when “good”
hypotheses are made. The formation of “good” hypotheses must occur a priori. To address these issues and paradoxes,
a fundamentally new approach to problems of cognition that is based on completely innate behavioral programs is proposed.
The process of cognition within the framework of the concept of a quantum metalanguage involves the selection of adequate
a priori existing (innate) programs (logical variables and rules for working with them) that are most adequate to a given
situation. The quantum properties of this metalanguage are necessary to implement such programs.
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Introduction
Problems of mechanisms of thinking in many ways
remain unresolved. An answer to Kant’s question
“How can synthetic judgments be a priori?” posed
240 years ago has not yet been found. Indeed,
despite significant progress made in the creation
of artificial intelligence systems, these systems still
cannot understand, acquire knowledge, create new
concepts, etc. These properties are most fundamental
to intellect and represent the greatest limitation of
artificial systems. A number of authors believe that
this challenge is not surmountable in principle and
that a strong AI (completely coinciding with human
intellect) will never be created.
Consideration of artificial intelligence in this
regard is fundamentally important, as in this case we
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are dealing with systems, the structures of which we
know. In regard to human thinking, the situation is
different - we do not know exactly which structures
store information and how such information is
processed. This has given rise to the most important
problem of what is innate and what is not.
Problems of cognition and thinking are at the
intersection of different sciences (see for example,
Miller, 2003) (Fig. 1).

However, the synthesis of these sciences in
relation to problems of cognition has not yet taken
place. Scientists of various cognitive sciences such as
linguistics, epistemology, the philosophy of science,
artificial intelligence, etc. do not often refer to one
another’s work. In particular, there is no single
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Figure 1. Cognition at the intersection of different sciences

approach to a major cognitive problem - the problem
of knowledge acquisition. Thus, a new cognitive
synthesis is needed.

Several approaches to the problem of cognition
have been developed. A number of these approaches
are based on the idea of the brain as a special structure
that cannot be realized within the framework of
any computing system. One objection to strong AI
is Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. A number of
articles (see, for example, Penrose, 1994) state that
a human understands, which is not provable, and
that the difference between a human’s thinking and a
computer system is based on Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem, which concludes that thinking uses noncomputable means. Another objection to strong AI is
Searle’s Chinese Room (1980), which is also related
to the term understanding, with which, in the author’s
opinion, no formal artificial system is endowed. At
the same time, the term understanding is poorly
defined by the authors. Thus, a certain indeterminate
property (or a set of properties such as the ability to
acquire knowledge, to make generalizations, etc.) is
attributed to a human, but proving anything under
these conditions is difficult.

A potentially radical solution to the problem
of acquiring knowledge is rooted in an assumption
of innateness (partial or complete). Within the
framework of the philosophy of science, this line of
reasoning is connected to Fodor (1983). Chomsky,
based on other considerations, came to a similar
conclusion on innate language (Chomsky, 1957;
2014). However, this approach requires justification
with the use of models and generalizations on
thinking in the broadest sense of the word.

Some authors (see, for example, Aerts et al.,
2011; Aerts et al., 2013; Pothos and Busemeyer,
2013; Khrennikov, 1999; Khrennikov, 2010a;
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Basieva et al., 2017) believe that a number of
problems related to thinking can be solved within
the framework of quantum mechanics. Korf, (2014)
considered potential quantum effects on brain
activity in a neurobiological context. The author
considered three types of theories according to
which the working of the brain is related to quantum
mechanics. The first states that quantum mechanics
are involved in the behaviors of molecules but are not
related to higher brain functions or consciousness.
The second states that the brain is viewed as part
of a world based on quantum mechanics (Hameroff
and Penrose, 2014, Smith, 2006; 2009). The third
uses quantum mechanics to model mental processes
and can be classified as quantum-like, as the authors
view quantum mechanics as a convenient formalism
for solving a number of decision-making problems.
One of the motivations of applying quantum
mechanics to processes of thinking was experiments
on decision making. Such experiments examine, for
example, the Elsberg paradox, the breaking of the
sure-thing principle, and other phenomena. In (de
Barros, 2012; Khrennikov, 2011; Aerts et al., 2011;
Basti et al., 2017) it was shown that the formalism
of quantum mechanics can help explain these
paradoxes. However, a question remains as to how
this quantum(-like) behavior is realized. Which
structures of the brain are responsible for it?
Thus, quantum mechanics has proven useful
for modeling the workings of cognitive functions. The
purpose of this article is to go further and show that
quantum mechanics can be used to solve the most
fundamental problems of thinking, such as those of
knowledge acquisition, understanding, new concept
generation, etc. The very phenomenon of thinking is
systemic in nature, and thus a systems approach must
be applied to problems of thinking in general and to
problems of acquiring knowledge in particular.
The problem of human consciousness is not
considered in this work. This, while related to the
problem of knowledge acquisition, is another matter
to which the great literature is devoted (Chalmers,
1996; Dennett, 2005).
Searle’s Chinese room, objections to strong AI and the
problem of knowledge acquisition

Central to the problem of cognition is understanding.
There are two different aspects of
understanding. The first is related to adequate
actions that show that a human (the intellectual
www.neuroquantology.com
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system) really understands what is in front of him
or her. The second is related to consciousness and
to feelings about what one sees. Feelings (qualia)
are thus attributed only to humans and not to an
arbitrary intellectual system. In this article we only
consider the first aspect of understanding. It is this
aspect that has a direct bearing on the problem of
knowledge acquisition, which is the main focus of
this article. For the second aspect, research on it has
a long history and several articles have been devoted
to it (see for example, Yampolskiy, 2017). Studying
and modeling this second aspect is difficult because
it is difficult to measure in an objective and humanindependent manner.
By understanding we of course refer to an
understanding of something new. Otherwise we are
considering an already known object, in relation to
which we can act adequately, i.e., its understanding
is a priori present.

One of the key thought experiments conducted
on this topic was Searle’s Chinese Room experiment.

In 1980, Searle (1980), with the help of a
thought experiment entitled “The Chinese Room”, put
forward a serious objection to the existence of strong
AI. In fact, this objection is critical to understanding
thinking as such. In the mental experiment, a human
in a room could communicate with the outside world
only with instructions written in Chinese, which he
did not know. Comments made on the instructions
were written in English. However, the instructions
were designed in such a way that they could be
executed with the help of comments but without
understanding what exactly is being done.

As a result, Searle concludes that while such a
system can pass a Turing test, no understanding of
the language of the system is given, meaning that
the Turing test is not an adequate test of cognitive
abilities. Searle’s arguments are aimed at criticizing
the view of “strong” artificial intelligence, according
to which computers equipped with a corresponding
program can understand natural language and
possess other mental abilities peculiar to people.
The hypothesis of weak artificial intelligence only
suggests that computers are capable of imitating a
human’s mental abilities, which corresponds to the
mental experiments conducted by Searle.
As Searle noted, syntax is not sufficient for
semantics.
The problem here is that within the framework
of this thought experiment the term understanding
eISSN 1303-5150

is poorly defined. The author believes that this is
something that is taken for granted. However, the
absence of a definition given explicitly does not allow
us to conclude whether an artificial intelligence
system is able to understand or whether it merely
imitates this process.

A large number of articles have been published
on the problem of the Chinese Room (see for example
Chalmers, 1996; Barsalou, 1999; Bishop et al., 2013).
Quantum versions of the Chinese Room have also
been developed. For example, Maruyama (2016)
considered another argument of Searle based upon
the observer-relativity of computation. According
to the author, calculations are dependent on the
observer but human intellect is not. Therefore,
intellect cannot be simulated through calculations.
Calculations must instead be interpreted by someone
(that is, understood). The author considered the
quantum mechanics of categories, from which
quantum linguistics arose.
A definition of understanding can be given
based on experiments that determine whether
a system (human) behaves appropriately after
receiving information from outside or not. What
does it mean, for example, to understand the term
“electrical socket”? It means that a human can use
this tool to perform certain actions (turn on a table
lamp, etc.). If this term is written, for example, in
Vietnamese, which the person does not know, then
the actions of the human will not be adequate, i.e.,
actions are given no value as a result of receiving
such a message.

Here, it is necessary to note the importance
of the recognition procedure, which has typically
received little attention in reference to the context of
the problem under consideration. This procedure in
its most general form involves the comparison of an
image obtained by receptors to some standard. As a
result, two options may be available: the image may
coincide with the standard (correspond to it) or not.
For the first case, it is known what the image is, as a
priori programs work with this standard and generate
adequate results, etc. Rather, the first case corresponds
to the achievement of understanding. However, in
this case we do not understand something new. In
the second case, when an image is not recognized, no
a priori programs are involved, adequate behavior is
not realized, and no understanding is achieved. This
is a general procedure (which underlies large subject
- pattern recognition) that is not directly related to
www.neuroquantology.com
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image processing methods, information transferring,
physical media, etc. That is, such a procedure
should be used in both living and artificial systems.
If the Chinese language is not determined based on
standards within an artificial intellectual system,
then it cannot act adequately in this regard, i.e., the
system does not understand it.

When a human is able to understand (as
manifested in adequate actions) what is written
in Chinese (never having studied it before), then
this is possible only in one version - when this
language nevertheless is a priori embedded in our
consciousness as a standard. The application of this
possibility is discussed in Section 7.
Other objections to strong AI have been put
forward by Penrose (1994). Penrose also believes
that intellect is an understanding that involves
consciousness. In the opinion of the author, a
distinction must be made between true intellect
and attempts to model it. Penrose argues that
understanding is not computable. As proof, he uses
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem and concludes
that conscious thinking has a non-computable
component. The author, however, concludes that
when the ability to understand is non-algorithmic,
then it can be simply and easily explained through
natural selection. As a means to solve this problem
Penrose suggested that quantum events occurring in
the microtubules of neurons are not computable.
Here, we would like to note that understanding
does not have to involve consciousness. When an
intelligent system of an arbitrary nature is capable of
adequately responding to a certain set of symbols, we
must conclude that it understands them. To ensure
that it is conscious of them is quite difficult from
an experimental point of view. The very concept of
“consciousness” does not have a clear definition.

If understanding is considered in this context
(as an adequate behavior), then different forms
of understanding must occur at the molecular
level (including neurons). Any cell, in addition to
transforming and transporting substances, at the
same time processes information. For example, in
(Gorlich et al., 2011) the cell is considered a semantic
system. The authors consider the codes that organize
the semantic dimension of molecular information.
Such operations implicitly involve recognition. If,
for example, a membrane receptor recognizes an
external signal (i.e., a reaction occurs between it
and a certain molecule according to the key-lock
eISSN 1303-5150

principle), this results in the further processing of this
signal, in its amplification, etc. We can state that the
cell has “understood” the signal. This understanding
is expressed as the cell’s adequate response to a certain
change in the environment. However, in this case, the
signal cannot be new for the cell or for an arbitrary system.

Thus, on one hand, the argument of the Chinese
Room is important in the sense that it is possible to
show through this framework that understanding
(and as will be shown below its consequences such
as the formation of new concepts, abstractions, etc.)
cannot be obtained based on any formal procedures
or programs developed accordingly. On the other
hand, the Chinese Room itself is nothing special
relative to other situations, as a human perceives
the world around him or her only through receptors
(senses). In this sense, we are all partially in the
Chinese Room. How then do we understand anything
new? If a child has learned a language, how does he
manage to understand it? The assertions of many
authors that a child is taught by trial and error cannot
be accepted as satisfactory, as a computer can also
act in such a way. In this case, an equally important
question arises as to how many trials and errors are
required? This question is considered below.
Objections like the Chinese Room are closely
related to the problem of knowledge acquisition. As
it was noted above, when a human or an intellectual
system recognizes an environment with the help
of receptors, only two possibilities are realized. 1 The image that appears in the environment is not
recognized, and as a result no a priori programs for
working with it are available. As a result, behaviors
will not become more adequate after the registration
of this image. 2 - The image is recognized, but this
can occur only when the system is given a priori
standard for its recognition. In this case, the system’s
behavior can become more adequate through the a
priori application of behavior programs. However,
knowledge acquisition in this case also does not
occur, as programs of behavior existed in the system
a priori. This problem is considered by Melkikh,
(2014a). In particular, in (Melkikh, 2014a) two
classes of behavior (Table 1) are distinguished for
animals and arbitrary intellectual systems:
It is shown that the behavior of type B is
contradictory and cannot be realized. According to
(Melkikh, 2014a), such a system of recognition and
decision-making can be described using the following
model:
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Image

Table 1. Two classes of behavior are distinguished for animals and
arbitrary intellectual systems (Melkikh 2014a).
Behavior based on innate
programs (А)

Includes conditional and
unconditional reflexes and the
simplest forms of learning.

An animal (intelligent system)
meets a recognized object. This
is accompanied by the running of
innate programs. An unrecognized
object can only trigger innate
programs. An adequate response
to the unrecognized object is
impossible.

Behavior based on knowledge
acquisition (В)
Includes learning experiences
(interactions with other animals)
and the logical formulation of new
concepts.
An animal (intelligent system)
meets an unrecognized object and
begins to respond to it adequately
through the acquisition of
knowledge.

Property 1: The system contains internal
independent objects (words of the language) Q1 ... Qn.
Operations P1 ... Pm on objects are possible. Operations
of new object (operation) creation are not defined.

Property 2: The system includes a receptor that
receives information on the state of the environment.
The receptor is capable of detecting objects q1 ... qm.
In this case, operations p1 ... pk can be performed on
objects. The receiving signal is compared to internal
objects present in the system (pattern recognition).
The system compares internal and external objects
of the language. Mathematically, this comparison can
be expressed in the form of equivalence (equality) of
any internal object to some of the external objects.

Property 3: From recognition (matching),
some internal object operations trigger effectors;
the system acts on the external environment. Every
action is evaluated using function Φ l (Qi , Pi ) (gain).
This value is greater when the system is more
successful. Without a loss of generality, we can
assume that the system is designed such that there
is a maximum condition: Φ l (Qi , Pi ) → max . The term
of “equivalence” is closely related to the gain and
represents an adequate reflection of reality.
Property 4: The system has limited memory
storage, which can store the results of previous
measurements or of intermediate operations.
The pattern recognition and decision-making
scheme can then be represented as the following
form: (Fig.2)

Let image Ω appear to the organism (system)
with properties 1-4, which can be described in terms
of the external language of receptors (registered).
However, no objects of the internal language are
relevant (in terms of equivalence) to external
language objects corresponding to this image. Then,
eISSN 1303-5150

Objects

?

Operation 1

Operation 2

Operation 3

?

Figure 2. The pattern recognition and decision-making scheme

the effector cannot perform operations or activities
that lead the system to obtain a certain gain (payoff).

Consider a universal translator that translates
one language into another and that can work with
an unrecognized image. In this case, the algorithm
cannot be run because the conditions required to run
it, cannot be formulated.
Suppose that the operation of supplementing
a list of operations and objects from external
alphabet phrases exists. However, this operation is
controversial because it can be only performed if an
external alphabet is part of the internal alphabet.
When a phrase is part of an internal alphabet, the
registered object is recognized, contradicting the
initial claim. In this context, language problems
require separate consideration and are discussed
below in paragraph 5.

In regard to pattern recognition and decisionmaking, the next version of the statement is
controversial: “to create a new standard requires
a new standard.” When an image does not match
an internal standard, the system must create a new
standard to make an adequate decision. However, its
creation is self-contradictory because the algorithm
that creates such standards must know them in
advance.
The contradictory nature of the acquisition of
knowledge based on learning automata is represented
by the following diagram (Melkikh, 2014a) (Fig. 3):
Thus, it is not clear how an arbitrary system
acquires knowledge, as new information is not
valuable, and valuable one is not new. That is, when
www.neuroquantology.com
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Figure 3. The contradictory nature of knowledge acquisition and learning automaton

a human is able to understand something that is
not available to a computer, then he is capable of
acquiring knowledge.

Often, the acquisition of knowledge is associated
with the concept of “intelligence.” There are many
definitions of “intelligence” (see, for example, Legg
and Hutter, 2007). For example, Gottfredson (1997)
defines this concept as:
«A very general mental capability that, among
other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve
problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex
ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is
not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill,
or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader
and deeper capability for comprehending our
surroundings—”catching on,” “making sense” of
things, or “figuring out” what to do».

Thus, the problem of knowledge acquisition
and the problem of understanding are closely related.
To determine whether an arbitrary system is able to
understand or acquire knowledge, it is necessary to
explicitly take the recognition process into account.
Ascending and descending approaches to AI and the
problem of knowledge acquisition

In reference to the problems discussed above it is
important to consider artificial intelligence systems,
which are distinguished (from the brain) by the fact
that their structures are known.
In artificial intelligence, two basic approaches
are used: ascending and descending approaches.
eISSN 1303-5150

An ascending approach involves the use of neural
networks, including promising newly developed
networks of deep learning (see for example, LeCun et
al., 2015; Sze et al., 2017). To train a neural network
on something, we must explore a large collection of
preliminary examples. Note that in these examples,
someone (a human) must explicitly indicate what kind
of thing it is. This instruction occurs in a special mode
- the training mode. The neural network itself does
not need to understand anything - it is understood
by the one who teaches it, i.e., the human. In the case
of unsupervised learning, neural networks are only
capable of clustering information. In this case, there
is no recognition.
Recently, the AlphaGo Zero algorithm achieved
superhuman performance in the game of Go, Chess
and other games using deep convolutional neural
networks, trained solely by reinforcement learning
from games of self-play (see, for example, Silver
et al., 2017). It was demonstrated that a generalpurpose reinforcement learning algorithm can
achieve, tabula rasa, (without any additional domain
knowledge except the rules of the game) superhuman
performance across many challenging domains. In
this case, however, new images do not arise, and
there is no understanding.

Note also that machine learning is applicable
only to problems for which there are sufficient initial
data (see for example Abu-Mostafa et al., 2012).
Machine learning does not create information but
rather uses it based on already available data. When
there are not enough training data, machine learning
www.neuroquantology.com
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methods do not work. It is also necessary to define the
term “data.” Clearly, if these data do not correspond
to the “meaning” a priori, it will not appear as a result
of further training. The collation of meaning to a
signal is a human’s task.

The descending approach is related to the
application of the Bayesian formula for conditional
probabilities and generally theory of Bayesian
networks. Hypotheses (generative models) are put
forward and subsequently verified (see for example,
Lake et al., 2015; Bonawitz et al., 2014). A Bayesian
system can be trained on a small number of examples,
but this requires the use of a set of hypotheses that
the system itself cannot offer. Hypotheses are again
formulated by those who understand (a human). This
method is considered in more detail in the following
section.
Several works have been devoted to children’s
learning processes. A number of authors believe (see
for example, Bonawitz et al., 2014) that children learn
in a Bayesian manner. However, this raises question
of who in this case forms hypotheses? When a
hypothesis is formed by an external system (another
human), then how does the trainee understand what
is being said when first presented with this situation
(new objects or images)? In the second case it can be
assumed that hypotheses are congenital (i.e., they
exist prior to the learning process).

It is often believed that children learn from
examples by default, but this is not the case. For
example, in (Melkikh, 2014a) social learning was
considered. Social learning is often considered
separately owing to its complexity and importance
to complex communities (transfer of experience
from parents to descendants and so on). However, in
terms of the problem addressed in this article, social
learning is not fundamentally different from other
forms of learning. We consider a case in which an
organism receives new information from its parents
or from other animals. Can the organism adapt to
new conditions in this case? Given what has been
said above, the answer is no.

Importantly we note that in this case, the
organism also receives information via receptors.
Therefore, any other organism (a member of the
flock, the parent, etc.) is interpreted as part of the
environment. Consequently, the aforementioned
scheme of measurement - recognition – decision
making holds. Regardless of actions the parent takes,
they can be adequately interpreted only in one case:
eISSN 1303-5150

when a signal has been recognized (compared to a
standard sample). In turn, this comparison is only
possible when a standard sample has already been
made available to the organism (as congenital).

Note also that “supervised learning” in
animals and humans is fundamentally different from
“supervised learning” in neural networks, in that
a neural network “teacher” can prepare a system
(i.e., to set connection weights between neurons
form outside), while for animals this is impossible.
All “teachers’” acts can be perceived only through
pattern recognition.
Thus, a child can “learn” only what he is ready
to absorb, for which he already has all necessary
programs, and training is only available to launch
such programs in a timely manner and to launch
programs that are needed in the near future.

In (Melkikh, 2014a) basic methods of solving
problems in AI are considered and it is shown that
all of these methods are based on the use of a priori
information. In addition to neural networks we list
the following tools:

1. Heuristic methods of problem solving are based

on aprioristic information of the object domain
that comprises a problem. Heuristics may prove
to be incapable of finding a solution altogether.
This limitation cannot be removed even from the
best heuristics (Garey and Johnson, 1978). A key
question concerns how heuristics arise. The theory
does not address questions of how we can develop
a new heuristic.

2. The recursive search represents a natural means

of realizing such strategies of artificial intelligence
through a graph search. However, an exact
objective should be set for this method to be used.
When objects (or even one object) are not defined,
a recursive procedure cannot be applied (Luger,
2003).

3. Production

systems are used for conflict
resolution. In this case, the system requires an a
priori standard sample (pattern) that determines
the possibility of using the rules of production
systems (Luger, 1994).

4. Expert systems are based on the same rules (Luger

2003). The core of an expert system is a knowledge
base that includes knowledge generated from
a particular applied domain. Knowledge in an
object domain determines and updates an expert
www.neuroquantology.com
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database (Minsky, 1987). Can we possibly imagine
a system that acts as an expert for itself? This
is clearly not possible because a code can be
corrected only when correct knowledge is known.

5. Recently, hybrid connectionist-symbolic systems

based on a synthesis of neural networks and based
on symbolic representations of knowledge (see
for example, Vilhelm et al., 2000; Kamsu-Foguem
et al., 2012; d’Avila Garcez et al., 2009) have been
proposed. These systems facilitate knowledge
acquisition through a variety of applications.
However, the term “knowledge acquisition” is
defined for such a system in a different sense than
it is in this article. In the context of this approach,
“knowledge acquisition” denotes that with help of
knowledge, some useful tasks can be completed
(e.g., in medicine). The functioning of such systems
a priori assumes that all characters (or simple
signals) or words written in a specific language are
recognized by a human or computer. In this sense,
they are innate. In this case, problems related
to determining whether knowledge is innate to
humans are not considered.

We can also consider a hybrid variant:
interactions between the brain and machine.
Indeed, at the moment, control technologies that
use brain signals to control a computer cursor or
hand prosthesis are actively being developed (see
for example, Mathot et al., 2016). However, these
technologies do not relate to the term understanding.
Thus, an analysis of main approaches to
the problem of knowledge acquisition in artificial
intelligence systems leads to the conclusion that in
either case all knowledge is a priori. In the first case,
a teacher (who can manage the system in a special
mode) has knowledge and in the second, the system
itself has them. No new knowledge appears in this
case.

In (Melkikh, 2014a) it is noted that a special
regime of system preparation can exist. As changes
within an organism and its interactions with its
environment are crucial when considering knowledge
acquisition and learning, these interactions should
be defined more precisely. Regarding processes of
knowledge acquisition and learning, interactions
between an organism and its environment must be
performed only through recognition. The organism
obtains all information on its environment through
its senses. Furthermore, this information is subject to
recognition, after which the organism decides what
eISSN 1303-5150

to do in the current situation. However, in principle,
an organism can interact with its environment in
another way – through preparation. The structure
of the system can be directly changed by acting on
it from the outside (not through the senses). This
method is widely used in engineering systems. For
example, a computer user can replace any part of a
system to create a different system. However, this
method is not related to learning or knowledge
acquisition (as in this case another system learns);
in addition, the method is not used in living systems.
Thus, the system’s preparation is not considered
further.
A possible answer to questions on the origins of
knowledge in artificial intelligence systems concerns
the existence of universal solvers. For example, an
analysis of universal solvers (Hernandez-Orallo,
2016) shows that
1. Some authors argue that there is an effective
search method, as the interval in which a
number (ε-acceptable policy) is located is
known. Additionally, various search variants are
considered. In principle, however, these search
methods implicitly assume that the object under
study is recognized. When it is not recognized (it
is new), the interval in which one wishes to search
is not known and the search space does not offer
any potential values.

2. The author (Hernandez-Orallo, 2016) appeals to
evolution as a search method, as by default it is
assumed that its opportunities to solve problems
are unlimited. However, references to evolution
are untenable, as we do not know how a search
actually occurs. The assumption of the Darwinian
search mechanism is presented with serious
conceptual difficulties associated with a need to
search through a large number of variants (see for
example Melkikh, 2014c; Melkikh and Khrennikov,
2017). The fact that this or that adaptation occurs
in life does not say anything about the fact that a
universal solver is used. Rather, it indicates that
a system has a priori information on the solution
which should be found.
3. In this connection, a question arises as to whether
there is at least one example of an artificial
universal solver that would work in life (with
real objects). The practice of solving technical
problems via intelligent systems shows that there
are no such solvers.
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4. Recognition models appear to be fundamentally
important. This process cannot be described
through words alone and must be modeled.

Can an intellectual system self-improve while
solving problems? If we could create a form of
superintelligence that could improve itself, then this
would be a breakthrough in the field of cognitive
sciences. However, it is important to accurately
define concepts. An improvement made in one area
does not imply anything about improving work in
another area. In (Yampolskiy, 2014; 2015), various
forms of intellectual system self-improvement are
considered:
- self-modification (1),

- self-improvement (self-adaptation) (2),
- recursive self-improvement (3).

The purpose of the first method is to protect
the program itself and not to improve it.

The second concerns the goal of many software
products to adjust the system to the user. For
example, genetic algorithms optimize parameters for
the analysis of a particular system through various
learning algorithms such as meta-calculations.

The third allows one to replace an algorithm
with a new algorithm. The author notes that this
approach has not yet been employed. In this regard,
it should be noted that this third method of selfimprovement cannot be implemented in principle,
as an algorithm must replace the algorithm that the
new algorithm must contain a priori.
Bayes hypotheses and trial and error method

As noted above, the trial and error method is
considered a common method of learning used by
humans and animals. In some cases, a human needs
to make only a few attempts to learn something.
However, why does such a method work? Let us
show that the working capacity of the trial and error
method is closely related to Bayesian hypotheses that
underlie it. We write the Bayesian formula as follows:
P (A / B ) =

P ( A) P ( B / A)
,
P (B )

Under A and B we have the following:

(3)

P (A) is the a priori probability of hypothesis A;

P (A / B) is the probability of hypothesis A
occurring with the occurrence of event B (a posteriori
probability);
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P (B / A) is the probability of event B occurring
with the truth of hypothesis A;
P (B) is the probability of event B occurring.

If the hypothesis put forward (explicitly or
implicitly) is valid (good, corresponds to reality),
then probability P (A / B) should be high. This means
that learning will follow
n

1
P (A / B ) ,

steps, which is a small number. However, questions
then arise as to where this hypothesis comes from.
Why is this hypothesis valid in any sense? As a natural
and non-contradictory answer to this question, the
hypotheses themselves are congenital or are derived
from inborn knowledge based on rules of inference.
Trials and errors in this case are only a consequence
of a lack of such knowledge due to uncertainties
related to the environment. Information obtained
through experiments and the number of experiments
the must be conducted to obtain such information
are related (see appendix 1).
A priori information can be calculated from
the Shannon formula based on a priori probability.
Thus, a good hypothesis is a hypothesis that contains
a considerable amount of a priori information on
the learning object. This information cannot arise
through the learning process but should be a priori,
i.e., congenital. However, this means that knowledge
is not acquired through such a process and only
applies a priori knowledge most appropriate to the
given situation. When a human (animal) immediately
understands what is before him and which actions
must be taken without trial and error (insight), then
this is possible only when the human already knew
this in advance (i.e., enough a priori information was
available on the object). Whether a human perceives
this process or not is another matter.

If, as a result of using the trial and error method,
the results of these trials (experiments) accumulate,
then repetition can be applied to reduce errors. In
(Melkikh, 2014a) the model of errors at recognition
is considered. According to (Melkikh, 2014a), errors
occur each time a device measures its environment,
potentially leading to erroneous recognition.
Therefore, the larger the degree of measurement
error, the smaller the fitness Φ value (fitness is at a
maximum when errors are absent). We refer to the
maximum fitness level as Φ0. Then we can write the
following (when errors are relatively small):
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What is innate?

Φ = Φ0 − ∆ ,

where Δ is a positive value denoting a decrease in
fitness resulting from a measurement error. From
error theory we know that random error decreases
with repeated measurements as the number of
measurements increases (when systematic inaccuracy
is present, it can be included in the maximum fitness
value). However, each measurement requires energy
to complete and as a result fitness values will
decrease. We denote a decrease in fitness resulting
from energy expended for a single measurement as
ε. Then we have the following formula for the fitness
value:
Φ = Φ0 − ε n −

∆
,
n

where n is the number of measurements.

(4)

Factor 1/ n appears with a decrease in
the random error value occurring from repeated
measurements. This formula can be used when
the measurement time is short compared to the
characteristic behavior time. Alternatively, when
measurements are collected slowly, the fitness
value will decrease because the organism will not
have enough time to measure rapid changes in the
environment.
The fitness value (4) may have an extremum
with respect to n, and thus we have:
 ∆
n= 
 2ε 

2/3

,

 1

Φ ( X ,Y ) =
Φ 0 ( X , Y ) − ε 1/ 3 ∆1/ 3  2 / 3 + 21/ 3  .
2


As the number of measurements is an integer,
the extremum exists only at Δ/ε > 2. Therefore, an
organism, which occupies a complex environment,
may find it unfavorable to immediately change its
behavior as its environment is altered and instead
might prefer to perform a set of measurements
and only then begin to act. In other words, to
initiate available programs an organism should first
recognize its environment and identify necessary
programs.

This behavior explains the fact that living
organisms form conditioned reflexes most often
as a result of the recurrence of an external signal.
Thus, repeated measurements of the state of the
environment from an organism decrease errors
during the operation of aprioristic programs.
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To understand mechanisms of acquiring knowledge
it is important to clarify the question of what can
be attributed to the innate in living and artificial
systems.

What is innate? The answer to this question
is quite complex. Even within the framework of
cognitive sciences, no unambiguous definition of
innate is given.

By the term instinct, as applied to the behavior
of animals and humans, we refer to complex
stereotyped forms of activity that are inherent of all
individuals of this species and that are inherited and
do not require training. Instinct represents a form
of species memory passed down from generation to
generation by inheritance. The behaviors of animals
and humans involve a complex interlacing of innate
and acquired skills.
Ethologists define instincts as specialized
morphological structures (a temporary organ of
the animal) that naturally appear in a specific social
situation (Lorenz, 1950). An instinctive reaction
is realized automatically with any presentation of
specific stimuli and is not corrected by circumstances
of the given context or by the animal’s past
experiences. In this case, innate response circuits are
triggered.
For example, Samuels (2004) considers several
definitions of innateness. The author notes that the
theory of innateness has been used to explain many
psychic phenomena. However, the concept should
be better defined. The author considers several
definitions of innateness:

ȇȇ Innateness as non-acquisition. Is universal
grammar innate? However, non-acquisition is
also poorly defined. Minimum definition is: a
characteristic is acquired from an object (e.g., an
organism) when and only when there is a period
of time in which an object has the characteristic in
question and a prior period in which it does not.
However, this is not enough, as at development all
cognitive abilities are absent.
ȇȇ Innateness as a presence at birth. That is they are
acquired in the minimal sense - during growth.
However, it is possible to train prior to birth.
Sexual signs are also absent (in part) at birth.
ȇȇ Innateness as a consequence of internal causes.
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ȇȇ Innateness as genetic determinism. However, here
it is impossible to trace a clear causal relationship.

ȇȇ Innateness as an invariant of development.

ȇȇ Innateness as something that has not been taught.
We in turn require a clear definition of training.

There are two prior opposing theories that
link behavior to genotypes. One theory conditionally
referred to as “behaviorism” denies the importance
of genes. However, another (“genetic determinism”)
states that genes completely determine behavior.
At present these extreme views have not been
confirmed. Studies of the individual development
of organisms show that in different environments
the same genotype can be expressed differently,
and the phenotypes and behaviors of animals and
humans depend not only on genes but also on the
environment (see for example Argawal, 2001;
Whitman and Agrawal, 2009).
For example, the study of the IQs of
monozygotic twins (see for example, Butcher et al.,
2008) unambiguously shows that genes play an
important role in intelligence. However, as shown
by experiments, identifying genes responsible
for specific aspects of behavior (e.g., learning)
is difficult even for the simplest organisms. For
example, Glanzman (2010) notes that the presence
of molecular pathways is not sufficient to understand
learning. Examples of Aplisia and Drosophila behavior
show that molecules such as GABA and glutamate
are associated with neuronal plasticity. However,
by themselves molecules cannot explain behaviors
without consideration of neural networks. «The takehome lesson from the two studies discussed here is
that knowledge of the key molecular players does not
provide a short cut to understanding memory and
cognition» (Glanzman, 2010). This conclusion can be
attributed to other organisms and behaviors.
According to experiments on human genome
mapping, a very small number of genetic markers are
related to intelligence test results (see, for example,
Coleman et al., 2018; Hill et al., 2018).

Thus, an organism can change its phenotype in
response to changes in its environment (phenotypic
plasticity). If we consider behavior, the special
case of phenotypic plasticity can be considered as
a form of neuroplasticity, as rooted in changes in
connections between neurons and in the strength of
synaptic contacts (synaptic plasticity) influenced by
eISSN 1303-5150

experience. Many mechanisms of synaptic plasticity
are common among vertebrates and invertebrates
(see for example, Glanzman, 2010).

Noble (2006) examined the relationship
between different levels of causality in cells. In his
view, genes do not represent a program because
many properties of an organism (cells) can be
realized only at the higher systems level. However,
mechanisms of this higher level remain unclear. Does
this level involve the use of algorithms? If so, where
do they come from, and if not, how does it work?
Various researchers (for example, Fodor, Pask,
Osherson) have suggested that some concepts of
human language are congenital. In this case, however,
formation mechanisms of remaining concepts remain
unclear.

For example, Fodor (1983) suggested that
there is a special language of thinking referred to as
mentaliz. According to Fodor, mentaliz is unique in
that it cannot be learned from one’s native language,
as it is innate. This applies, in his opinion, to a number
of other concepts (e.g., BACHELOR, EFFECT, ISLAND,
TRAPEZOID, WEEK) that the author attributes to
primitive and innate. It remains unclear, however,
how other concepts arise.
Fodor and Pylyshyn (2016) explored an
analogy between thinking and computers based on
computation: “Cognitive processes are computations,
which is to say that they apply to ....” This analogy
also means that cognitive processes must be based
on innate knowledge, as computers work this way.

Chomsky’s theory (see, for example, Chomsky,
1957; 1965) posits that language involves the use
of deep and surface structures. Surface structures
‘face outward’ as represented by spoken utterances
while deep structures ‘face inward’ and express
underlying relations between words and conceptual
meanings. Transformational grammar is generative
grammar that applies a limited series of rules
expressed in mathematical notation that transforms
deep structures into well-formed surface structures.
Transformational grammar thus relates meaning
and sound.

The Chomsky hierarchy is a hierarchy of
classes of formal grammar. The hierarchy imposes
a logical structure to different language classes and
provides a basis for understanding the relationship
between grammars (devices that enumerate valid
sentences within languages). In order of increasing
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expressive power, it considers regular, contextfree, context-sensitive, and recursively enumerable
grammars. Each class represents a strict subset of the
class above it, i.e., each successive class can generate
a broader set of formal languages.

Later versions of Chomsky’s theory (the
minimalist program, Chomsky, 2015) make strong
statements on universal grammar. According to his
view, grammatical principles underlying languages
are innate and unchanged, and differences between
languages of the world can be explained in terms
of parametric brain settings that can be compared
to switches. According to this point of view, a child
must learn lexical units (i.e., words) and morphemes
to learn a language and must determine necessary
parameter values in reference to several key
examples.
This approach, according to Chomsky,
explains the amazing speed at which children
can learn languages, consistent stages of child
language learning regardless of languages learned,
and characteristic errors that children make while
learning their native language and seemingly logical
errors that are not made. According to Chomsky, the
absence or occurrence of such errors is related to the
method used: generalized (innate) or dependent on a
specific language.

Chomsky notes that the infinite number of
proposals that a human can make serves as a strong
reason to reject the behaviorist concept of language
teaching by reinforcing (fixing) conditioned reflexes.
Young children can make new proposals not backed
by past behavioral experience. The understanding
of language is conditioned less by past experiences
than by the so-called Language Acquisition Device,
the internal structure of the human psyche. The
mechanism of language learning determines the
volume of permissible grammatical constructions and
helps a child master new grammatical constructions
from the language he has heard.

According to the author, congenital grammars
arose through random mutation. However,
mechanisms for the emergence of other language
concepts remain unclear.

According to Chomsky meaning are hardwired already somewhere inside the computational
device. In his opinion meaning are independent of
social purposes, arising from genetically determined
syntactic structure.
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Chomsky’s theory has been challenged by
many authors through theory theory (Gopnik, 2003;
Gopnik, 2012) and usage-based theory (Tomasello,
2009), for example.

According to Tomasello (2009), the innate
grammatical module does not help a child assimilate
his first language as much as different mechanisms of
thinking, such as the ability to distribute objects into
categories and to understand how they are related.
Children begin by mastering simple grammatical
schemes and then comprehend the rules that govern
them. According to usage-based theory (Tomasello,
2009), children intuitively guess the intentions of
other people. A child learns standard schemes by
watching other people. Thus, in the author’s opinion,
the cognitive abilities of the brain serve as decisive
factors of language learning. However, in light of that
stated above with respect to problems of knowledge
acquisition, these abilities must be explained. What,
for example, does the term “assimilate” mean? How
specifically does cognitive ability work with language
when a child is exposed to a new environment?

According to theory theory (see for example,
Gopnik, 2003; 2012), while obtaining knowledge
about the world, children use the same tools as
adults do when testing scientific principles. Children
develop theories. According to the author (Gopnik
2003, 2012), infants are born with initial innate
theories. However, the range of theories that can
be generated is much wider than the limited set of
representations that are possible from innate views.
We learn by modifying, revising and eventually
replacing earlier theories with later ones.
Theory theory is primarily applied to our
everyday knowledge of the world, to our everyday
understanding of biology, physics, psychology etc.

A significant drawback of the theory theory
and the usual theory of language is their lack of basis
in models and inaccurate definition of terms. What,
for example, occurs when modifying one’s original
knowledge? How do we create new theories?

From this connection a question arises as to
where theories of science come from (especially in
the case of mathematics). Wigner (1967) explored
the inexplicable effectiveness of mathematics.
According to Wigner, mathematics is smarter than
us. This means that the laws of mathematics and
physics existed independently of humans before
humans discovered them.
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We show that the creation of concepts
and generalizations is contradictory in principle
regardless of the material basis of an intellectual
system.
Creation of new concepts, abstraction and inductive
logic

Let us consider several properties of thinking that
are considered classical: the ability to generalize,
intuition, abstraction, the creation of new concepts,
and others. These concepts are at the core of human
intellect and perhaps of the intelligence of animals. On
the other hand, these properties are highly difficult (if
not impossible) to apply on a computer (an intelligent
system). Indeed, for example, abstraction modeling
methods (Goertzel, 1993) inevitably suggest that
a concept that should appear as a result of such an
abstraction must be a priori defined in a mathematical
model. Consequently, the implementation of such a
model within an intellectual system also does not
lead to the formation of a real abstraction.

In classical experiments with animals and
young children (Gellerman, 1933) their abilities to
form general concepts were measured. It is shown
that children can identify the notion of “triangularity”
in consideration triangles of different textures, colors,
etc. That is, children (and some animals) are able to
identify common geometric shapes and to recognize
these commonalities in a new figure. Note, however,
that when an image is recognized, it is translated
into a mathematical (abstract) form. That is, along
with other characteristics of an image, the property
of “triangularity” is also recognized. Otherwise, it is
impossible to explain how such a notion could have
“formed” if it had not been programmed in advance.
As is shown above, the trial and error method can
be effective only when it is based on a hypothesis
that is close to the truth a priori. Therefore, the trial
and error method implicitly includes the Bayesian
approach.

Lake and co-authors (2015) noted that two
features of human thinking cannot be realized by
computer systems. A human can learn a new concept
with one attempt while a machine must make dozens
or hundreds of attempts. Even children can make
generalizations with one attempt. While learning,
individuals can identify new options, functions and
categories. Machines cannot do this. How do people
learn from such a small amount of data? To address
this problem, the authors proposed a Bayesian
learning program that in their opinion supports
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the generalization and learning of new concepts.
In this case, new programs can be developed from
components of past ones.

However, in this case, the generalization and
creation of new concepts is something quite different.
If we consider signs registered by a system as images,
then they can be processed in various ways, and from
them it is possible to form new images, etc. However,
this new image does not have semantics, such that
one does not know what it displays. Accordingly, it
reflects not the creation of a concept but the creation
of a new sign. Operations of “averaging” signs can of
course also be carried out. As a result, from a set of
signs one can identify common features and form
an “average” sign. However, as what it means is not
known (the semantics are not averaged), the system
cannot take any adequate action in this case. Thus, a
generalization cannot be made at the syntactic level,
as the semantics of these symbols are determined in
a completely different way.
Consider for this connection the operation of
“generalization.” Let there be images in the external
environment. After recognition, they correspond to
concepts A1, ... An of the internal language. When an
image is not recognized, it is impossible to carry out
operations related to semantics (i.e., it is discarded).
Generalization means that all concepts belong to
a certain set. In this case, two options are possible.
Either they already belong to it and a priori there are
operations adequate for this set (i.e., what to do with
this set as the whole), or they do not belong to this
set. In the latter case, the operation of replenishing
the set with the object is not defined.
The problem of knowledge acquisition can
also be considered based on logic. According to
classical logic, to realize a proposition (that includes
a subject, predicate, bundle and quantifier), all of
its components must be a priori determined. This
is often implicitly implied, but for our purposes it is
necessary to note the importance of such an a priori
definition. It is impossible to form a judgment of an
unknown (unrecognized) object. Logical conclusions
can be divided into inductive and deductive
conclusions (see, for example, Baronett, 2008). It
is assumed that deductive conclusions are strict
while inductive conclusions are only probabilistic.
Bertrand Russell noted (1998) that deduction does
not give rise to new knowledge. New knowledge can
only be obtained through induction. The problem of
inductive inference has been raised repeatedly in
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the field of philosophy. In particular, David Hume
denied the validity of induction completely. On
this connection Bertrand Russell remarked: “What
these arguments prove is ... that induction is an
independent logical principle that cannot be deduced
from experience or from other logical principles, and
that without this principle, science is impossible.”

The analogy in logic is also regarded as a
form of inference (see, for example, Baronett 2008),
though its conclusions on induction are probabilistic.
This probability value can be calculated from the
Bayesian formula. However, as noted above, for
this probability to be as great as possible, “good”
hypotheses on which the Bayes formula itself is
based must be applied. It remains unclear what are
the mechanisms of a good hypothesis generation.
The existence of such a hypothesis has only been
postulated.
In the framework of formal (mathematical)
logic, induction is also present (e.g., in Peano
arithmetic). However, such induction can only work
when all of its variants are determined in advance.
Mathematical induction cannot work with objects
that are not defined. Sometimes such a definition is
given implicitly, but it does exist in any case.
Within the framework of logic, complete and
incomplete induction are distinguished. Most often,
induction is incomplete, and as shown above an
unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn from it.

In the case of complete induction we draw
conclusions from a full enumeration of species of a
certain genus on the whole genus; it is obvious that
in using such a method of inference we obtain a quite
reliable conclusion, and this method of inference
cannot raise any doubts. In identifying the subject of
a logical group with objects of particular judgments,
we can apply this definition to the whole group.
The scheme of complete induction can be
written as follows:
1. Set Ω consists of elements Ω1, Ω2, ..., Ωk.

2. Where Ω1 has characteristic ψ, where Ω2 has
characteristic ψ, and where all elements of Ω3 to Ωk
have characteristic ψ.

3. Consequently, all elements of set Ω have
characteristic ψ.
In relation to the problem of knowledge
acquisition, this situation can be interpreted as
follows: in the case of acquiring knowledge, we
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always deal with a new object. As shown above, the
reliability of inductive outputs is directly dependent
on a priori information on this object. When a priori
information is completely absent, no inductive
conclusions can be drawn on the object.
If, from this point of view, we consider complete
induction, it becomes equivalent to mathematical
induction from which it is possible to draw definite
conclusions, but induction can be complete only
when all the elements of sets are determined a
priori. In this case, no acquisition of knowledge (and
understanding, the creation of new concepts, etc.)
can occur in principle.
In general, we can conclude that mathematical
logic and set theory are most closely related to
thinking as such. The paradoxes of set theory and
mathematical logic reflect the incompleteness of our
knowledge. Namely, our thinking occurs partly in a
latent form. At the same time, part of our thinking
is not realized. Thus, some of the mathematical
evidence is implicitly implied. We simply know that
mathematics (e.g., an infinite set of real numbers) is
constructed in this manner and not otherwise.

Consider the abstraction of identification as
a means of forming general abstract concepts. This
method involves taking into account only differences
that for a given situation and for one reason or
another are essential and in ignoring others and
that are insignificant when considering initial
objects. Initial objects that differ in an insignificant
way are considered to be the same, and in terms
of speech aspects, the abstraction of identification
is manifested in the fact that two identical source
objects when identified can be referred to as the
same abstract object by applying the corresponding
term. The following examples can be considered
• The identification of identical figures leads to
the generation of an abstract figure (an abstract
word);
• The identification of an equivalent fundamental
sequence of rational numbers leads to the
generation of a real number;

• The identification of isomorphic groups leads to
the generation of an abstract group.

However, the word leads does not say anything
about mechanisms facilitating the appearance of
such concepts. It is much more logical to assume that
concepts of “abstract letters,” “abstract groups,” etc.
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already exist. As a special case, they must contain an
isomorphic group, a rational number, and a letter.
Therefore, when abstracting, a human only discovers
such general concepts and does not create them.
Epistemology identifies various kinds of
correct statements (see for example, Audi, 2011).
There are self-evident statements and statements
that are based on experience. Concerning the latter,
however, one must bear in mind that all empirical
must be recognized. Therefore, it is implicitly
based on hypotheses that are postulated. That is,
it is based on a priori knowledge. Analytical and
synthetic correctness are also considered. Analytical
correctness is obtained from proof. However, this is
then just part of mathematical logic, for which the
acquisition of new knowledge is impossible. Selfevident statements are innate by definition.
The problem of knowledge acquisition as a
part of philosophy has a long history. In particular,
the notion that knowledge is to some extent
predetermined arose a very long time ago.
Socrates believed that soul is immortal (and
repeatedly incarnated) and that the acquisition of
knowledge is only an anamnesis. According to the
ideas of Spinoza and Leibniz, thinking is a spiritual
automaton that produces truth and that works
according to a pre-set, pre-determined program.
However, this raises questions as to where in such
automaton errors come from. Descartes postulated
that there is freedom of will according to which
decisions are not predetermined.

Kant considered such categories innate and that
the creative method works based on them. However,
what is the creative method? This term remains
poorly defined and does not clarify mechanisms of
the emergence of new knowledge.
Kant asserted: “If we have a green leaf before
us, our mind, comparing it with other leaves and
considering through the prism of the category of
universality, develops the concept of a leaf in general
with the help of a productive imagination.” This raises
questions regarding what productive imagination is.
What is universality? How does the mind define a
category? Kant could not provide answers to these
questions. To date progress in this area has been
limited.

Any reasoning is formulated based on
elementary operations of a certain language.
Elementary logical operations can be performed
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by classical and quantum systems. In quantum
mechanics, operations are performed on qubits.
Simple unitary operations over qubits are called
quantum logical gates. For example, when a
qubit passes from one state to another, 0 → 0 ,
1 → exp(iωt ) 1 then it is said that after time t a qubit
acts on the gate

Any reasoning is formulated on the basis of
elementary operations within a certain language.
Elementary logical operations can be performed by
both classical and quantum systems. In quantum
mechanics, operations are performed on qubits.
Simple unitary operations over qubits are called
quantum logical gates. For example, if a qubit passes
from one state to another, 0 → 0 , 1 → exp(iωt ) 1
then it is said that after a time t the gate
0 
1

P(t ) = 
 0 exp(iωt )

acted on a qubit.

As other elementary quantum gates one can
identify “equivalence,” “not,” etc. All of these gates
act on one qubit and can be realized by means of
some Hamiltonian of the Schrodinger equation. More
detailed formalisms of quantum logic are described
for example in (Haven and Khrennikov, 2017).
It is necessary, however, to emphasize that
problems of justifying logic are not related to which
particular model of logic (quantum or classical) is
used. Thus, the problem of knowledge acquisition
from a logical point of view cannot be solved within
the framework of a given language either based on
quantum theory or based on classical logic. Rather,
for any language there is no means to justify the
acquisition of knowledge.

Can neurophysiology provide an answer to the
question of understanding and thinking?
If behavioral programs are innate, this in one
way or another should be reflected in the structure
of the brain.

The relationship between congenital programs
of behavior and the structure of the brain is discussed
in a previous book (Sverdlik, 2016). According to
the author, the whole organism can be conditionally
divided into two axes. The first axis includes our
internal organs and tissues, and the second axis, the
external axis, includes the skin and the sense organs.
Accordingly, we can distinguish two divisions of the
nervous system as follows: the autonomic (serving
www.neuroquantology.com
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the inner life of the organism) and the somatic
(serving the external life) nervous system.

Different divisions of the brain are more or
less involved in the process of the perception of the
surrounding world and thinking.
The hypothalamus is the central regulator of
the internal axis. The hypothalamus regulates the
endocrine activity of the brain and the homeostasis
of the body including processes such as food control,
protective behavior, thirst, thermoregulation,
memory, emotions, etc. (see for example, Swanson
2000; Canteras 2002).
The amygdala is involved in emotional and
social processes (discrimination of faces, etc.)
(Kheirbeck and Hen, 2011; Todorov and Engell,
2008).

The cortical mantle of the large hemispheres
is the regulator of the outer axis. Conscious abstract
thinking is carried out by stereotypes of the external
axis. The resolving power of the autonomic nervous
system is low and that of the somatic nervous system
is high. Conscious thinking operates in working
memory, in which there is a simultaneous retention
of several pieces of information.
In the author’s opinion, the neurophysiological
meaning of abstraction is that, from the long and
entangled neural networks short networks (that
generalize their content) are formed. Here, however,
an important question arises about the mechanisms
of the formation of such networks. This mechanism
should be a consequence of some physical processes.
According to the author (Sverdlik, 2016), the
goal of abstraction is to find something common,
which unified different information. The cortex
works inaccurately, so the precision of mathematics
does not depend on it. The limbic system is the
basis of emotions. It is possible to attribute some
neurobiological address to emotions. The emotional
brain is the place in which the inner axis reaches the
maximum contact with the external axis. There, the
body and the cortex (algorithmic mind) find many
points of contact. Emotions invisibly participate in
solving any abstract problems.

In the author’s opinion, to find the right solution
for any problem means to recognize it as the right
one. Recognition is controlled by the limbic (sensory)
system. Neurons of the limbic system generate a
sense of recognition when external information
eISSN 1303-5150

coincides with inner information. At the same time,
the bodily component of cognition is important.

According to the author, true discovery is
impossible without the use of non-algorithmic
instruments. The body is not capable of constructing
logical chains, and internal information is encoded
somewhere in the molecules. Intuition is the
emergence of a solution without the participation of
working memory.
At the same time, however, the question
arises as to why the body should be considered
non-algorithmic. After all, the algorithm, in the
most general sense, should describe all continuous
processes.

On the other hand, non-algorithmicity (if it
exists) simply means that this knowledge already
exists.

To address the questions of understanding
and consciousness, Koch and Tononi (2008) took a
neurobiological point of view. Studying the activity of
the brain with the help of a tomograph, the authors
singled out the neuronal correlates of consciousness.
The authors proposed an informational theory of
consciousness, the main provisions of which are the
following two statements:
1. Consciousness is a high informativity. Every
private conscious state excludes a large number of
other states.
2. Conscious information is unified.

If you present different images to a computer,
the understanding of what is depicted or what looks
wrong would allow a computer to pass a Turing test.
However, according to the authors, the creation of a
universal system that understands what is in front
of it is impossible. However, progress in solving
complex problems is attributed to the construction
of computers that are organized similarly to the
mammalian brain.
It remains unclear, however, how the proposed
postulates help to understand how understanding
arises in the event that a human meets an unknown
image. How does the complexity of the brain and the
large number of connections between neurons lead
to understanding?
Quantum intelligence and quantum metalanguage

A number of authors associate the solution of a
number of problems of the intellect with quantum
www.neuroquantology.com
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mechanics. These approaches can be divided into
main motivations, i.e., reasons that, in the opinion
of the authors, make the application of quantum
mechanics to the thinking process promising. In
my opinion, the most significant motivations are as
follows.

One of the important areas of the application of
quantum mechanics to cognitive sciences is decision
making. This is an actively developing field that
includes many researchers. The main motivation here
is the decision, with the help of quantum mechanics, of
some paradoxes of decision making. Such paradoxes,
for example, include the Ellsberg paradox, which is a
violation of the sure-thing principle and others. In the
opinion of different authors, it is quantum mechanics
that makes it possible to explain decision making in
situations that the classical probability theory cannot
explain. The most important property of quantum
probabilities is that, in addition to the usual classical
probabilities, they contain interference terms related
to the wave character of quantum particles.

In the frame of «quantum-like consciousness»
Khrennikov (2010a) proposed, that the brain
performs “computation-thinking” by using algorithms
of quantum computing in the complex Hilbert space
of mental quantum-like models. Evolution of mental
wave function in the frame of this model can be
described with the Schrodinger equation:

dΨ ˆ .
= HΨ
dt
Here
i

ˆ2
ˆ b + V ( aˆ ) - is the operator of «mental
H
=
2

energy», â and b̂ - are two self-adjoint operators,
and V ( aˆ ) - is the «mental potential». As will be
shown below, the Hilbert space can be represented
in the form of a subspace in which the metalanguage
operates.

The application of Bohmian version of quantum
mechanics to the processes of thinking is caused by
the fact, that the pilot wave (on the concept of which
Bohm’s quantum mechanics is largely based) can,
to some extent, be considered the simplest form
of consciousness. For example, Pylkkanen (2016)
believes that some properties of quantum systems can
help to understand the properties of consciousness.
The pilot wave carries active information and, in a
sense, informs the particle about its surroundings.
According to the author, consciousness exists only
eISSN 1303-5150

because there is a higher level of information. This last
remark can be attributed not only to consciousness
but also to thinking in general. In the works of
Khrennikov, mental information fields were defined
in the “information space”, reflecting a hierarchic
tree-like representation of information by cognitive
systems (mathematically, such mental trees can
be represented with p-adic numbers (Khrennikov,
2010b).
A second quantization method is also
promising for quantum-like modeling in which
particle creation and annihilation operators are used
(Bagarello, 2012; Bagarello et al., 2017). In this case,
these operators can be used to create or destroy the
simplest information units of decision making, such
as “Yes” or “No”.

The application of quantum mechanics to
thinking can also be justified by the fact that the
brain itself, on the basis of which thought is realized,
functions as a quantum system. In previous works
(Melkikh 2014b; Melkikh and Meijer, 2018), it was
shown that the work of neurons at the molecular
level is contradictory. This phenomenon is reflected
in the fact that the accuracy of the biochemical
reactions of protein-ligand and protein-protein
interactions, as well as the accuracy of the folding
of proteins and DNA (RNA), cannot be justified by
the presence of short-range potentials between
biologically important molecules. In this case, the
entangled (in the classical sense) and the inoperable
states of macromolecules should be realized with
an overwhelming probability. In particular, this will
lead to the impossibility of the efficient transport of
substances both inside neurons and through their
membranes. This phenomenon (formulated by the
authors as a generalized Levinthal’s paradox) requires
a fundamental revision in the understanding of the
mechanisms of the work of cells at the molecular
level. To solve the paradox, the authors proposed a
quantum model of intermolecular interactions. The
most significant point of this model is the long-range
interaction, which ensures the efficient operation
of intracellular molecular machines. Here, the
motivation for using quantum mechanics is based on
the fact that classical mechanics cannot, in principle,
provide such an interaction.

As noted above, the motivation of Penrose’s
proposals on the application of quantum mechanics
is that he connects mental processes with the collapse
of the wave function, which, in the author’s opinion,
www.neuroquantology.com
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is caused by the effects of gravity. Moreover, noncomputability plays an important role. According
to the author, the ability to understand cannot be
formalized with the help of a particular set of rules.
The author comes to the conclusion that “for the
establishment of mathematical truth, mathematicians
do not apply knowingly justified algorithms.”
Is it possible to conclude from this idea that
understanding in principle is not formalizable? Such
a conclusion cannot be made, since unprovability
occurs only within a certain language. There is no
reason to say that the language we use is closed and
unchanged.

Hence, what follows is a natural logical
conclusion that the concept of truth (adequacy in the
broad sense) in relation to certain constructions is
innate. This concept is just as axiomatic as the rules
of the language within which there is a discussion
(modeling) of truth.
As for quantum gravity, its necessity for the
operation of microtubules in neurons can hardly be
justified, since the effects of quantum gravity should
appear at much higher energies. Nevertheless, the
concept of microtubules and the cytoskeleton as
quantum systems is currently developing (see for
example, Cocchi et al., 2017).

The ideas of Zizzi can, in a sense, be considered
a continuation of Penrose’s ideas. According to Zizzi
(2012), there are three ways of expressing mental
activity: classical computer, quantum computer and
a non-computational way. In the author’s opinion,
we do not realize quantum calculations, but classical
ones are conscious. The third way is connected with
meta-knowledge - intuition, which is controlled by
the quantum metalanguage. It is this language that
distinguishes people from computers. People, in
addition to logical rules, have meta-logical rules. We
can agree with this, but it is necessary to clarify that
these rules do not fundamentally differ from logical
rules; they are simply hidden and manifest only in
certain situations. Such properties of metalanguage
will be discussed below in more details.
According to the author (Zizzi, 2012), a
mathematician can uncomputably assert what
Gödel’s theorem considers unprovable. We note that
Gödel’s theorem addresses a closed logical system
into which the hidden metalanguage is not included.
Within the framework of the metalanguage, these
statements could be completely provable. Although
eISSN 1303-5150

there certainly will be other unprovable statements,
this is another matter.

In the author’s opinion, the quantum
metalanguage governs our own language. When
a mathematician claims the correctness of some
statement G(F), in reality, he operates at the level of
the quantum metalanguage.
As will be shown in the next section, the
concept of quantum metalanguage is very important
and can be used to solve the problem of knowledge
acquisition and to create a new paradigm of thinking
in general.
Discussion

Quantum metalanguage and innate programs of
behavior

Discussion the problems of knowledge acquisition
in the context of various sciences (epistemology,
philosophy of science, neurocomputing and others)
leads to the need for a new cognitive synthesis. This
synthesis must be connected with a new answer to
the following basic question of cognitive sciences:
where does the knowledge come from? To this end,
it is necessary to take advantage of all that has been
achieved in various cognitive sciences. Previously,
for example, Griffits (2015) proposed to consider
the active use of computers and calculations in the
cognitive sciences, which occurs at present as a new
cognitive revolution. However, such use alone does
not provide new answers to fundamental questions
but only helps to speed up the experiments. The
analysis of artificial intelligence, conducted in Section
5, shows that the computer does not provide new
knowledge.
To more accurately define the concepts related
to thinking, the adequacy of human behavior has been
suggested (Melkikh, 2014a). Indeed, we can verify
only experimentally whether a human has realized
something new and whether he could create a new
abstract concept. In this case, the only way to verify
this is to determine how the behavior of a human (an
arbitrary intellectual system) has changed as a result
of understanding. If this behavior has become, to some
extent, more adequate than before understanding,
then we can say that understanding really occurred.
If no adequacy is observed, then there is no way to
verify that understanding really occurred.
If we consider an intellectual system in the
form of an automaton with given properties, then
the adequacy of its behavior can be estimated, for
www.neuroquantology.com
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example, by the gain that this system obtains from
interaction with the environment. The following
model of behavior is proposed (Melkikh, 2014a):
ϕ ( t + 1) =
Φ (ϕ ( t ) , s ( t + 1) )
f ( t ) = F (ϕ ( t ) ) .

Where, φ describes internal states of
automaton, f is the action of automaton, t is the
discrete time and s is the input variable.

The definition of knowledge acquisition of in
accordance with the proposed model is follows:

Definition. This will be understood by
the acquisition of knowledge of such a process,
followed by the emergence of an environmentally
unrecognized image c* not including preparation
of the systems and only to provide the system with
information regarding the external environment
through receptors, which results in a behavior of the
system that is estimated to increase the expectation
of winning at some preset value of W0:
W ( c *) > W0 .

The assignment of the image to unrecognized
objects indicates that there is no prior information
about the object.
The hypothesis of the congenital behavior
of animals is proposed (Melkikh, 2014), the main
provisions of which are the following:

1. Innate

programs of behavior are formed
on the basis of genes during ontogenesis
(morphogenesis).

The formation process of these programs is
not obvious because, for example, in an organism,
there is a clear discrepancy between the information
contained in the genes and the complexity of
the nervous system. However, the modeling of
morphogenesis is a separate problem and is not
considered in this paper.

2. As a result of receptors receiving signals from

the environment, remembering and recognition
occur.

Memory of the time or spatial distribution of the
signals used by the organism to run a priori behavior
programs is the most adequate for the observed
situation. If recognition is not possible (the appeared
image is new), then either no a priori programs start
or the programs that correspond most closely (on the
tree of recognition) to the recognized image are run.
eISSN 1303-5150

3. At the presence of uncertainty in the environment

or errors in receptors aprioristic programs run
only after several repetitions.

Repetition can reduce random error in the
registration signal. This situation is largely similar to
the decrease of random errors in measurements.

4. Another response to the uncertainty of the

environment is a trial and error method, which
allows the system to select the most appropriate
aprioristic behavior program.

5. An interaction with another organism that

transfers the experience of one organism with the
environment (see items 2-4) to another is only
possible if both the organisms have the same a
priori programs relating to the present situation.

6. All programs of animal behavior are innate. For

technical systems, they are aprioristic programs.

Thus, animal learning caused by uncertainty
in the environment is the method of choice for the a
priori (innate) program, which is most appropriate
for a certain situation. The new behavior program
cannot be formed on the basis of an experience or
interaction with other animals. This hypothesis may
well be extended to the process of human cognition.

Thus, to learn is to choose one of the a priori
programs most appropriate to a given case. To
quickly understand the situation (insight) means
to immediately choose such a program. To learn by
trial and error means to not immediately find such
a program because of interference, environmental
uncertainty, etc.
To solve the problem of knowledge acquisition,
consider the concept of metalanguage introduced
by Tarski. It is a higher-level language that works
with other languages. Some operations can be used
to generate new languages from given languages.
At the same time, operations such as concatenation,
intersection, association and others are defined.
Suppose that such operations are defined on
our language. These operations are defined in some
higher-level language L(Fig. 4).

Language L2 (our) is constantly replenished
due to the innate quantum language L1 according
to the rules of language L . Thus, we can build the
following logical chain, modeling thinking as follows:
Changes in the environment → registration
by the receptors → recognition with the L2 language
www.neuroquantology.com
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framework of quantum mechanics of particles, the
following set acts as a language:

{Ψ, Hˆ } .

That is, the Hamiltonian can be considered
as a set of operations on wave functions. However,
generally speaking, to construct a quantum model of
an arbitrary system, it is necessary to consider the
quantization of the fields.
Figure 4. Higher-level language

→ if not → recognition with the metalanguage →
operations on the L2 language involving the image,
such as generalization and the formation of new
concepts → the introduction of a new character
symbol in the L2 language (together with possible
operations) → new knowledge. This sequence
of actions can also be presented in the form of a
flowchart (Fig. 5):

The metalanguage operates in a more general
space, part of which is the Hilbert space of wave
functions. The elements of the metalanguage can also
be the creation and annihilation operators applied
to various elements of the language. With the help
of such operators in the language, new concepts are
selected from a list of a priori existing concepts.

For effective functioning, a quantum
metalanguage must have a large information
capacity in an orders of magnitude greater than
the capacity of any of the known languages. At
first glance, such a requirement contradicts the
comparatively small informational capacity of genes.
Indeed, genomes of higher organisms contain only
about a gigabyte of information, which is clearly
insufficient to manage such complex behavior as
human behavior. This contradiction can be solved
on the basis of the assumption that the interaction
between biologically important molecules (including
neurons) is essentially a quantum effect (Melkikh,
2014b; Melkikh and Meijer, 2018). As noted above,
the essence of the proposed model is that longrange potentials act between biologically important
molecules, which allow the modulation of their
movement. This additional interaction allows us
to increase the possible information capacity of
molecules by orders of magnitude, as well as cells
in general, which is not related directly to genes.
Experiments were proposed to test this hypothesis
in previous works (Melkikh, 2014b; Melkikh and
Meijer, 2018).

Within the framework of the new concept of
innate behavior, we can answer the following Kant’s
questions:
Figure 5. Logical chain, modeling thinking

Quantum mechanics represents the natural
conditions for the formulation of the metalanguage,
the discreteness of energy and states. Within the
eISSN 1303-5150

ȇȇ How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?
ȇȇ How is human freedom possible?

The first question can be answered as follows:
a priori judgments are the consequences of the innate
quantum metalanguage, which is adequate a priori to
the existing reality.
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The second question can be answered in such
a way that what is considered free will is the result
of unconscious metalanguage algorithms. If the basis
of thinking is quantum mechanics, then this naturally
explains the existence of probabilistic judgments
(which seem to be arbitrariness and freedom). As is
known, the outcome of an experiment with quantum
particles can only be predicted probabilistically. This
property, with respect to operations over elements
of the language, can be treated as freedom of will.

Consider how a human learns a new language
within the framework of the concept of innate
behavior. From this point of view, the presence of
Chomsky’s proposed Language Acquisition Device
is quite natural. This is nothing other than an innate
program of behavior. Moreover, it can be said that this
is not a mechanism for extracting the language but
rather a mechanism for including an innate program
that implements the language. This applies, of
course, not only to the native language of any person
but to any language in general. However, we know
that the ability to learn languages is different among
all people. The mechanism of this phenomenon
within the framework of the metalanguage can be
thought of as the following: all people have the same
congenital programs, however, they start differently
in the development process. This process is largely
determined by the environment, which leads to the
fact that some programs are not run at all. In this
sense, the programs under which we operate are
operational programs. Most of the programs are
hidden and not operational. They cannot manifest
themselves in the course of a human life.

the latter contains many vague terms, and the
mechanisms for mastering new terms, understanding
new concepts and so on are contradictory. However,
Chomsky’s approach also needs further development.
If only a part of the language is innate, it is not clear
where the remaining parts originate. In this case, it is
logically consistent that the whole language is innate.
This does not mean that the language in this case
acts as a kind of rigid structure. A natural property of
algorithms and computer programs written on their
basis are operators of the following type:
if А then В, else
if С then D, else

if E then F else….

Thus, completely innate behavior allows
to flexibly react to changes in the environment,
including forming (which means choosing from
ready-made concepts) various new concepts in
different life situations.

Let us consider a simple example. How can
a child create the concept of a square as a result of
communication with the outside world? Let the child
be surrounded by the following objects (Fig. 6):
At some initial stages of its development,
generalization simply does not occur, and the child
perceives these objects as different. However, in
the future, the following occurs: the recognition of
all these objects includes the congenital concept of
a “square”. That is, with their recognition, the child,

Let the child in the appropriate situations
(surrounding objects) be given words that correspond
to these subjects. After numerous repetitions, the
innate programs for working with these words are
run. At the same time, the understanding of words
is present a priori. The further generalization of
concepts (words) occurs in a similar way; there is
recognition of the fact that a given set of words refers
to a particular (a priori) set that is characterized
by some generalized concept. After recognition, the
conclusion is drawn that the concept is formed. All
programs of work with such an abstract concept
exist a priori (they are innate).
Thus, if one considers Chomsky’s approach to
language acquisition from this point of view, then
it can be called more correct than, for example,
the cognitive approach or the theory theory, since
eISSN 1303-5150

Figure 6. Different objects and concept of a square
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in addition to other qualities of objects, recognizes
the objects as belonging to a set of “squares”. This
set, with all its properties, is also innate, and the
information and programs are written on an innate
quantum metalanguage. At a certain stage (when
a real need arises), these congenital programs are
translated from the quantum metalanguage into the
child’s language. The concept of “square” thus begins
to work, i.е. the child begins to use this concept in
life and in the future to more adequately address
emerging problems.
A number of experiments to test the innate
behavioral programs were proposed earlier
(Melkikh, 2014a; 2014b; Melkikh and Khrennikov,
2015). Planning and conducting such experiments is
closely related to a precise understanding of what is
innate (see, section 4).
In the end, only such experiments (or the like)
can finally resolve the question of whether cognitive
effects are quantum or quantum-like.
Thus, the new paradigm of cognitive sciences
can be formulated in the form of the following
provisions:

1. All human behavior is innate. It seems to us
that, as a result of learning and gaining experience,
we can create new concepts. However, we are just
beginning to apply the concepts that were already
available.

2. Bayesian learning is entirely based on good
hypotheses. These hypotheses are good because
they are part of innate programs of behavior that are
adequate a priori to the surrounding world.
3. When we say that we understand something,
it means that it seems new, recognized, and it
corresponds to some innate standard.

4. Congenital behavior programs allow
behavior to be flexible through multiple types of
structures of “if ... then ...”.
Conclusion

A systems analysis of the processes of understanding,
generalizing and knowledge acquisition leads
to the conclusion that these processes are
contradictory. However, their detailed consideration
is fundamentally important for understanding
intelligence as such. The problem of the Chinese
Searle room is considered, and it is shown that this
problem can be naturally solved on the basis of the
innate knowledge of the language. In this sense
eISSN 1303-5150

(meaning precisely the acquisition of knowledge, not
feelings), a human is no different from a computer.

To solve these problems and paradoxes, a
quantum metalanguage model is proposed that
provides cognitive function only at the expense of
innate behavioral programs. As a result, it is possible
to explain consistently the mechanisms of the
emergence of new concepts and generalizations. A
priori correct judgments are possible because they
are correct innately. As a result of training, only a
choice of appropriate behavioral programs occurs,
in which all new concepts, generalizations, and so on
are already included a priori. The fact that artificial
intelligence systems work successfully is due to only
one thing - a significantly increased speed of pattern
recognition. This speed now allows the solving of
many tasks online. However, this does not mean
that such intellectual systems are able to acquire
knowledge or understand something new.
Appendix 1

Connection between information, obtained
experiment and the number of measurements

in

In a previous paper (Melkikh, 2014a), the trial
and error method as a series of experiments was
considered, which will result in finding an adequate
algorithm or the absence of an adequate algorithm.
In information theory, the degree of uncertainty
of experiment β with possible outcomes and their
probabilities p1, p2…pk is usually characterized by the
Shannon entropy:
k

H ( β ) = −∑ pi log 2 pi .
i =1

If this value equals zero, the outcome of the
experiment is known in advance. Any measurement
or supervision α prior to experiment β can limit the
quantity of possible experimental outcomes and
thus reduce a degree of its uncertainty. The fact that
the realization of experiment α reduces a degree of
uncertainty in experiment β is reflected through the
conditional entropy H(β/α) of experiment β under
the condition of α being less than (more precisely,
less than or equal to) the initial entropy of the same
experiment. Thus, if experiment β does not depend
on α, the realization of α does not reduce the entropy
of β:
H (β /α ) = H (β ) ,

If the result of α completely predetermines an
outcome of β, the entropy decreases to zero: H ( β / α ) = 0
. Thus, the difference
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I (α
=
, β ) H (β ) − H (β /α )

specifies how much the realization of experiment
α reduces the uncertainty of experiment β. This
difference represents the quantity of information
in experiment β, which is contained in experiment
α. Here, information (according to the information
theory) is understood as the uncertainty that is
removed when a message is received.

There is an interrelation between the number
of experiments and the information received as
a result of each experiment. For example, if the
experience is found with an adequate algorithm,
each experience corresponds to receiving one bit of
information. Suppose that the system has n degrees
of freedom, each of which may be in one of m states.
If, at the beginning of the experiment, there is no a
priori information to find an adequate algorithm,
then we obtain the average number of steps required
to achieve it, which is equal to the total number of
possible states:
N = mn .

If n is sufficiently large, then the number of
steps is exponentially large, even for m = 2.

The number of steps corresponds to Shannon
entropy:
=
H log
=
n log 2 m .
2 N

In this case, each bit of a priori information
reduces the search area in half.
References

Abu-Mostafa YS, Magdon-Ismail M, Lin H-T. Learning from data.
Pasadena: AMLbook.com, 2012.

Aerts D, Sozzo S, Veloz T. Quantum structure of negation. Frontiers
in Psychology 2013; 6: 1447.
Aerts D, Gabora L, Sozzo S, Veloz T. Quantum structure in cognition:
fundamentals and applications. arXiv:1104.3344v1, 2011.

Agrawal AA. Phenotypic Plasticity in the Interactions and
Evolution of Species. Science 2001; 294: 321-326.
Audi R. Epistemology. Third edition. Routledge. Taylor and
Francis Group. New York, London, 2011.

Bagarello F. Quantum dynamics for classical systems: with
applications of the number operator. New York: J. Wiley, 2012.
Bagarello F, Basieva I, Khrennikov A. Quantum field inspired
model of decision making: Asymptotic stabilization of belief
state via interaction with surrounding mental environment.
Journal of Mathematical Psychology 2017; 82: 159-168.

de Barros AJ. Quantum-like model of behavioral response
computation using neural oscillators. Biosystems 2012; 110:
171-182.
eISSN 1303-5150

Baronett S. Logic. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall,
2008.
Barsalou LW. Perceptions of perceptual symbols. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 1999; 22(4): 637-660.

Basieva I, Pothos E, Trueblood J, Khrennikov A, Busemeyer J.
Quantum probability updating from zero prior (by-passing
Cromwell’s rule). Journal of Mathematical Psychology 2017;
77: 58-69.
Basti G, Capolupo A, Vitiello G. Quantum field theory and
coalgebraic logic in theoretical computer science. Progress in
Biophysics and Molecular Biology 2017; 130(A): 39-52.
Bishop JM, Nasuto SJ, Coecke B. ‘Quantum Linguistics’ and Searle’s
Chinese Room Argument. Müller V. (eds) In “Philosophy
and Theory of Artificial Intelligence”. Studies in Applied
Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 5. Springer,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013: 17-28.

Bonawitz E, Denison S, Griffiths TL, Gopnik A. Probabilistic
models, learning algorithms, and response variability:
sampling in cognitive development. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 2014; 18(10): 497-500.
Butcher LM, Davis OSP, Craig IW, Plomin R. Genome‐wide
quantitative trait locus association scan of general cognitive
ability using pooled DNA and 500K single nucleotide
polymorphism microarrays. Genes, Brain and Behavior 2008;
7(4): 435-446.

Canteras NS. The medial hypothalamic defensive system:
Hodological organization and functional implications.
Pharmacology, Biochemistry and Behavior 2002; 71: 481–491.
Chalmers D. The conscious mind. New York. Oxford University
Press, 1996.

Chomsky N. Syntactic Structures. The Hague/Paris: Mouton,
1957.
Chomsky N. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. MIT Press, 1965.

Chomsky N. The minimalist program. The MIT Press. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 2015.
Cocchi M, Minuto C, Tonello L, Gabrielli F, Bernroider G, Tuszynski
JA, Cappello F, Rasenick M. Linoleic acid: Is this the key that
unlocks the quantum brain? Insights linking broken symmetries
in molecular biology, mood disorders and personalistic
emergentism. BMC Neuroscience 2017; 18: 38-48.

Coleman JRI, Bryois J, Gaspar HA, Jansen PR. et al. Biological
annotation of genetic loci associated with intelligence in a
meta-analysis of 87,740 individuals. Molecular psychiatry
2018; 8: 1.

d’Avila Garcez AS, Lamb LC, Gabbay DM. Neural-Symbolic
Cognitive Reasoning, Cognitive Technologies. SpringerVerlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
Dennett D. Sweet dreams. Philosophical obstracles to a science of
consciousness. A Bradford Book, The MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and London, England, 2005.
Fodor JA. The Modularity of Mind: an Essay of Faculty Psychology.
MIT Press, 1983.

Fodor JA and Pylyshyn ZW. Minds without meanings. An essay on
the content of concepts. The MIT Press, 2016.
www.neuroquantology.com

94

NeuroQuantology | January 2019| Volume 17 | Issue 01 | Page 72-96| doi: 10.14704/nq.2019.17.01.1904
Melkikh AV., Quantum Metalanguage and The New Cognitive Synthesis

Garey M and Johnson D. Computers and Intractability: A Guide
to the Theory of NP-Completeness. Freeman, San Francisco,
1979.
Gellerman LW. Form Discrimination in Chimpanzees and TwoYear-Old Children: I. Form (Triangularity) Per Se, The
Pedagogical Seminary and Journal of Genetic Psychology
1933; 42(1): 3-27.

Glanzman DL. Common Mechanisms of Synaptic Plasticity in
Vertebrates and Invertebrates. Minireview. Curr Biol 2010;
20: 31-36.
Goertzel B. The structure of intelligence. A new mathematical
model of mind. Springer-Verlag. New York, 1993.

Gopnik A. (2003) The theory theory as an alternative to the
innateness hypothesis. Book chapter in: In L. Antony and N.
Hornstein (Eds.), Chomsky and his critics. Oxford: Blackwells.
Retrieved 2013-04-26.
Gopnik A. Reconstructing constructivism: Causal models, Bayesian
learning mechanisms, and the theory theory. American
Psychological Association 2012; 138: 1085–1108.
Gorlich D, Artmann S, Dittrich P. Cells as semantic systems. Bioch
Bioph Acta 2011; 1810: 914–923.

Gottfredson LS. Mainstream Science on Intelligence (editorial).
Intelligence 1997; 24: 13–23.

Griffiths TL. Manifesto for a new (computational) cognitive
revolution. Cognition 2015; 135: 21-23.

Hameroff S and Penrose R. Consciousness in the universe: A
review of the ‘Orch OR’ theory. Phys Life Rev 2014; 11: 39-78.
Haven E and Khrennikov A. The Palgrave handbook of quantum
models in social science. Applications and grand challenges.
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2017.

Hernandez-Orallo J. The measure of all minds. Evaluation of
natural and artificial intelligence. Cambridge University
Press, 2016.
Hill WD, Marioni RE, Maghzian O, Ritchie SJ, Hagenaars SP,
McIntosh AM, Gale CR, Davies G, Deary IJ. A combined analysis
of genetically correlated traits identifies 187 loci and a role
for neurogenesis and myelination in intelligence. Molecular
psychiatry 2018.
Kamsu-Foguem B, Tchuenté-Foguem G, Allart L, Zennir Y, Vilhelm
Y, Mehdaoui H, Zitouni D, Hubert H, Lemdani M, Ravaux
P. User-centered visual analysis using a hybrid reasoning
architecture for intensive care units. Decision Support
Systems 2012; 54(1): 496–509.

Kant I. Critique of pure reason. Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Khrennikov A. Classical and quantum mechanics on information
spaces with applications to cognitive, psychological, social
and anomalous phenomena. Foundations of Physics 1999;
29(7): 1065-1098.
Khrennikov A. Ubiquitous quantum structure: from psychology
to finances, Springer, Berlin-Heidelberg-New York, 2010a.
Khrennikov A. Modelling of psychological behavior on the basis
of ultrametric mental space: Encoding of categories by balls.
P-Adic Numbers, Ultrametric Analysis, and Applications
2010b; 2, N. 1: 1-20.
eISSN 1303-5150

Khrennikov A. Quantum-like model of processing of information
in the brain based on classical electromagnetic field.
Biosystems 2011; 105(3): 250-262.

Kheirbeck MA and Hen R. Dorsal vs ventral hippocampal
neurogenesis: implications for cognition and mood.
Neuropsychopharmacology 2011; 36(1): 373–374.
Koch C and Tononi G. Consciousness as integrated information.
Biological Bulletin 2008; 215(3): 216-242.

Korf J. Quantum and multidimensional explanations in a
neurobiological context of mind. The Neurocsientist 2015;
21(4): 345-355.

Lake BM, Salakhutdinov R, Tenenbaum JB. Human-level concept
learning through probabilistic program induction. Science
2015; 350: 1332-1338.
LeCun Y, BengioY, Hinton G. Deep learning. Nature 2015; 521:
436–444.

Legg S, Hutter M. (2007) A collection of definitions of intelligence.
Advances of Artificial General Intelligence: Concepts,
Architectures and Algorithms. Eds. Goertzel, B., Wang, P., IOP
Press: 17-24.

Lorenz KZ. (1950) The comparative method in studying innate
behavior patterns. in “Physiological Mechanisms of Animal
Behavior”. 221-268. Cambridge University Press.
Luger GF. Cognitive Science: The Science of Intelligent Systems.
Academic Press, San Diego and New York, 1994.

Luger GF. Artificial intelligence. Structures and strategies for
complex problem solving. Fourth edition. Addison Wesley,
2003.

Maruyama Y. AI, Quantum Information, and External Semantic
Realism: Searle’s Observer-Relativity and Chinese Room,
Revisited. InFundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence
2016; pp: 115-127. Springer, Cham.
Mathôt S, Melmi J-B, Van Der Linden L, Van Der Stigchel S. The
mind-writing pupil: a human-computer interface based on
decoding of covert attention through pupillometry. PLoS ONE
2016; 11 (2): e0148805.

Melkikh AV. The No Free Lunch Theorem and hypothesis of
instinctive animal behavior. Artificial Intelligence Research
2014a; 3(4): 43-63.

Melkikh AV. Congenital programs of the behavior and nontrivial
quantum effects in the neurons work. Biosystems 2014b;
119: 10-19.
Melkikh AV. Quantum information and the problem of
mechanisms of biological evolution. BioSystems 2014c; 115:
33-45.
Melkikh AV and Meijer DKF. On a generalized Levinthal’s
paradox: the role of long- and short range interactions in
complex bio-molecular reactions, including protein and DNA
folding. Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 2018;
132: 57-79.

Melkikh AV and Khrennikov A. Nontrivial quantum and quantumlike effects in biosystems: unsolved questions and paradoxes.
Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology 2015; 119(2):
137-161.
www.neuroquantology.com

95

NeuroQuantology | January 2019| Volume 17 | Issue 01 | Page 72-96| doi: 10.14704/nq.2019.17.01.1904
Melkikh AV., Quantum Metalanguage and The New Cognitive Synthesis

Melkikh AV and Mahecha DS. On the Broader Sense of Life and
Evolution: Its Mechanisms, Origin and Probability across the
Universe: Journal of Astrobiology & Outreach 2017; 5(3).

Smith CU. The ‘hard problem’ and the quantum physicists. Part 2:
modern times. Brain Cogn 2009; 71: 54–63.

Minsky ML. The Society of Mind. William Heinemann Ltd,
London, 1987.

Swanson LW. Cerebral Hemisphere Regulation of Motivated
Behavior. Brain Research 2000; 886: 113–164.

Miller GA. The cognitive revolution: a historical perspective.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2003; 7(3): 141-144.

Noble D. The Music of Life. Biology Beyond Genes, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2006.

Osherson D, Stob M, Weinstein S. Systems that learn. MIT Press.
Cambridge MA, 1986.

Pask G. The cybernetics of human learning and performance.
Hutchinson, 1975.
Penrose R. Shadows of mind. A search of the missing science of
consciousness. Oxford University Press. New York, Oxford,
1994.
Pothos EM and Busemeyer, J.M. Can quantum probability provide
a new direction for cognitive modeling? Behavioral and brain
sciences 2013; 36: 255–327.

Pylkkanen P. Can Bohmian quantum information help us to
understand consciousness? In: Atmanspacher H., Filk T.,
Pothos E. (eds) Quantum Interaction. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer, Cham 2016; l 9535: 76-87.
Russell B. History of western philosophy. Routledge. Tailor and
Francis Group. London and New York, 2009.
Samuels R. Innateness in cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences 2004; 8(3): 136-141.
Searle JR. Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 1980; 3(3): 417–457.

Silver D, Hubert T, Schrittwieser J, Antonoglou I, Lai M, Guez
A, Lanctot M, Sifre L, Kumaran D, Graepel T, Lillicrap T,
Simonyan K, Hassabis D. Mastering chess and shogi by
self-play with a general reinforcement learning algorithm.
arXiv:1712.01815v1. 2017.
Smith CU. The ‘hard problem’ and the quantum physicists. Part 1:
the first generation. Brain Cogn 2006; 61: 181–188.

eISSN 1303-5150

Sverdlik A. How our emotions and bodies are vital for abstract
thought: perfect mathematics for imperfect minds. Taylor
and Francis. New York, 2018.

Sze V, Chen Y-H, Yang T-J, Emer J. Efficient processing of deep neural
networks: a tutorial and survey. arXiv:1703.09039v2. 2017.
Tomasello M. Constructing a language. A usage-based theory of
language acquisition. Harvard University Press. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 2009.
Todorov A and Engell AD. The role of the amygdala in implicit
evaluation of emotionally neutral faces. Social Cognitive and
Affective Neuroscience 2008; 3(4): 303–312.

Vilhelm C, Ravaux P, Calvelo D, Jaborska A, Chambrin M-C,
Boniface M. Think!: a unified numerical-symbolic knowledge
representation scheme and reasoning system. Artificial
Intelligence 2000; 116(1–2): 67–85.
Wigner E. The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in
natural sciences. In Symmetries and Reflections. Indiana
University Press, 1967; pp: 222-237.

Whitman DW and Agrawal A. What is phenotypic plasticity
and why is it important? Phenotypic Plasticity of Insects:
Mechanisms and Consequences (ed. by D. W. Whitman and
T. N. Ananthakrishnan), Science Publishers, Enfield, New
Hampshire 2009; pp: 1–63.
Yampolsky RV. On the Limits of Recursively Self-Improving AGI.
In: Bieger J., Goertzel B., Potapov A. (eds) Artificial General
Intelligence. AGI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer, Cham, 2015; 9205.
Yampolskiy RV. Form seed AI to technological singularity via
recursively self-improving software. arXiv: 1502.06512, 2015.

Yampolskiy RV. Detecting qualia in natural and artificial agents.
arXiv:1712.04020, 2017.

Zizzi P. Non-algorithmic side of the mind. arXiv:1205.1820, 2012.

www.neuroquantology.com

96

